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Women's Work: Attitudes, Regulation, and Lack 
of Power within the Sex Industry 
Heidi Machen * 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the country, female erotic dancers are fighting for the right 
to be treated as employees rather than exploited as independent contrac-
tors.' It is no surprise that employers, including those who employ erotic 
dancers, classify their workers as independent contractors: this arrangement 
allows them to pay little or no salary, provide few benefits, avoid messy 
paperwork, and avoid layoffs if the economy declines.2 Although the 
independent contractor classification hatms erotic dancers by depriving 
them of job benefits and a minimum wage, most dancers have been reticent 
to challenge this employment status because of fear of losing their jobs and 
of the social stigma which will attach once they publicly identify them-
selves as erotic dancers. 3 
Job classification is a divisive issue among erotic dancers. Many 
dancers are inclined to acquiesce to club owners, who choose the 
independent contractor employment classification,4 because the dancers 
fear that any action taken for self-protection will lead to retaliation by the 
employer. 5 These fears are not unfounded; some women have been fired 
* Heidi is a 1996 graduate of University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
She would like to give special thanks to the many people who assisted with editing this 
Note, particularly Joanne Hughes, Tristan Bettencourt, Joshua Koran, Steven Coopersmith, 
and the Note Editors of The Hastings Women's Law Journal. 
1. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc. , 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993); Vickery 
v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
2. Eric Brazil, Erotic Dancers Sue for Job Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 25, 1994, at AI, 
A18; see also Part-Time Jobs Without Benefits Expand. Pay Lags As Employer Flexibility 
Grows, 21 BNA PENSION AND BENEFITS REP. 1123, 1123 (l994). 
3. Nina Martin, Dancers Cope with the Latest Labor Trend: Making Employees 
Independent Contractors, CAL. LAW., July 1995, at 85. 
4. See Jesse Hamlin, Independence Day for Strippers, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1994, at 
E2. 
5. See, e.g., Andrew Leonard, Market Street Blues, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, July 14,1993, 
at 20. 
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within mere weeks of joining a lawsuit against the theatre in which they 
worked.6 An intolerant and unsupportive society, combined with economic 
necessity, discourages most women in the profession from taking a position 
contrary to that of their employer. 7 
As independent contractors, erotic dancers receive their incomes solely 
from tips, receive no benefits, and must pay booking or stage-use fees to 
the clubs in which they work. 8 The only reason customers pay the often 
exorbitant entrance fee which many strip clubs charge is to see the 
dancers,9 yet the typical strip theatre does not share this revenue with the 
performers. 1O Instead, the dancers must pay the theatres for the privilege 
of performing. Thus, the theatres profit twice--once from the clients and 
once from the dancers. This means that the theatres indirectly receive a 
portion of the dancers' tips, a violation of the law in some states. 11 
This Note will examine current legal issues regarding the independent 
contractor status of erotic dancers and seek to provide insight into the 
social climate in which these dancers fight for employee status. Section II 
details some of the history of women in the workforce generally and of the 
sex industry specifically. Section III analyzes the economic and social 
barriers that inhibit erotic dancers from challenging unfair working 
conditions, including misclassification as independent contractors. Section 
IV summarizes the current litigation challenging the classification of erotic 
dancers as independent contractors rather than as employees, and Section 
V articulates the policy reasons supporting a guaranteed minimum wage for 
erotic dancers. Finally, Section VI offers a proposed solution to the social 
and legal problems which many sex workers face, a solution supported by 
stated public policy. 
6. See, e.g., Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 13, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, 
Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994); Declaration of Deanna Diaz at para. 
2, Vickery (No. 959610). 
7. Leonard, supra note 5, at 21. 
8. /d.; see also Brazil, supra note 2. Booking fees, as the name indicates, are 
purportedly used to pay the salaries of the persons who make out the dancers' schedules for 
the convenience of both the theatres and the workers. Strip Clubs ostensibly charge a 
stage-use fee for the short-tenn lease of a stage upon which a perfonner dances several 
times per work shift for the pleasure of customers who pay door charges to the theatres. 
My familiarity with booking fees and stage-use fees results from many conversations with 
dancers from the O'Farrell Theatre and other theatres in my capacity as a summer associate 
for the Vickery plaintiffs' counsel during the summer of 1994. 
9. Martin, supra note 3, at 53. 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 1989); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196-d (Consol. 
1995). 
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II. Women In The Workforce 
After the American Revolution, married women were encouraged to 
work by "pleas to patriotism and by injunctions to render useful ser-
vice . . .. Women knew they were essential workers, yet wage work was 
not to be essential in their lives," since their lives were largely focused on 
marriage and homemaking. 12 Men, regardless of their marital status, were 
the only ones who were offered economic incentives for productive 
work. 13 
Throughout Western Europe and the United States, many single, 
working-class women of the 19th century worked as domestics, sweated 
laborers, and household workers; 14 however, low market values, dangerous 
working conditions, and dehumanizing treatment in service jobs led many 
of these women to choose a life of prostitution. IS 
Additionally, many women became prostitutes as a rebellion against the 
classist society that had denied them any hope of social mobility.16 With 
an income generated from prostitution, working-class women could dress 
in fine clothing, which society usually recognized as a symbol of the upper 
class. 17 This subterfuge could help a woman attain identification with and 
respect from the upper class. "Dress was a particularly potent way to 
display and play with notions of respectability, allure, independence, and 
status and to assert a distinctive identity and presence."18 
In 1920, several significant events took place which may have 
legitimized women's place in the workforce in modem America. In this 
year, suffrage was ratified, the League of Women Voters was established, 
and, most significant to the representation of women in the workforce, 
Congress created the Women's Bureau in the Department of Labor and 
commissioned it to promote the welfare of working women. 19 
By 1970, forty-three percent of women sixteen years and older made 
up thirty-eight percent of the workforce. 20 The choices of occupation for 
women, however, remained narrow. The majority of employed women still 
12. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1982). 
13. Id. at 21. 
14. NICKlE ROBERTS, WHORES IN HISTORY 231-32 (1993); see also KATHY PEISS, CHEAP 
AMUSEMENTS: WORKING WOMEN AND LEISURE IN TURN-0F-THE-CENTURY NEW YORK 35 
(1986). 
15. ROBERTS, supra note 14 at 232-33. 
16. Id. at 233-34; see also PEISS, supra note 14, at 63-65. 
17. ROBERTS, supra note 14 at 234. 
18. PEISS, supra note 14, at 63. 
19. Catherine East, The Current Status of the Employment of Women, in WOMEN IN THE 
WORKFORCE 7 (Mildred E. Katzell & William C. Byham eds., 1972). 
20. Id. 
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occupied gender-stratified and dead-end positions such as clerical workers, 
factory workers, and service workers. 21 The few women who managed 
to reach the professional world were most likely teachers or nurs-
es22--caretaker roles which traditionally fell to women, even in a 
non-professional capacity. Further, wage disparity was readily apparent, 
with women making only 60.5% of the amount earned by men.23 
Even now, in the 1990s, women average only eighty cents to every 
dollar that men earn.24 This figure would seem to indicate an improve-
ment in wages for women. However, according to Susan Faludi, men's 
salaries decreased during this period, which accounts for the lessening of 
difference between male and female earnings. 25 The persistence of 
unequal pay makes clear that the working world does not place equal value 
on work performed by women. 
Perhaps the first place that women entered the paid workforce, was as 
sex workers. 26 Prostitution, after all, is commonly referred to as 'the 
oldest profession.' The allure of sex work is multifaceted. Significantly, 
while few qualifications are required to enter the sex industry, the financial 
rewards are usually great. This is one field of employment in which 
women generally do not compete with men but may still earn a salary 
which rivals that of a typical man. Considering that approximately eighty 
percent of women are working in the ten lowest paying job categories,27 
and that the average woman can make more money as a stripper, lap 
dancer, or prostitute than she can as a child care worker,28 it is no wonder 
that a woman might choose an occupation within the sex industry. 
Further, sex work can offer a woman a chance to set the rules--to be 
the one in charge--at least with her customers. F or the most part, in an 
erotic theatre or in the field of prostitution, the woman may choose her 
client from among the available customers and may refuse to perform for 
or to remain with a customer at her wil1. 29 The degree of unwanted 
sexual attention that a woman may have been subjected to for years in 
21. Id.; see also, KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 303. 
22. East, supra note 19, at 9. 
23. Id. 
24. See, e.g., Take Notice, Hous. eHRON., Jan. 22, 1995, at 2; Women's Salaries Are 
Catching Up With Men 's-But Aren't There Yet, SMALL CORP. UPDATE, Aug. 1994, at 16. 
25. SUSAN F ALUDI, BACKLASH 364 (1981). 
26. Sex work is an all-encompassing term used to refer to a popUlation of prostitutes, 
phone-sex workers, nude dancers, pornographic actors and models, and even artists' models. 
See generally SEX WORK (Priscilla Alexander & Frederique Delacourte eds., 1987). 
27. Rose Simon, Lap Dancing Ruling Lets Strip Fans Sink Even Lower, TORONTO STAR, 
Feb. 28, 1994, at At7. 
28. Id. 
29. It is my understanding, based on conversations with both erotic dancers and other sex 
workers, that female erotic performers and most prostitutes may decline to sell services to, 
or spend time with, customers whom they find objectionable. 
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more mainstream occupations may be the same or less in the sex industry, 
but more often than not, the sex worker is at least in a position to 
financially profit from it.30 Women have historically experienced 
difficulty attaining autonomy. Women mayor may not enter the sex 
industry for the degree of autonomy its jobs offer, but this added benefit 
may become a major factor which keeps them in the profession. 
However, once established in the profession, a woman is inhibited from 
improving her working conditions because of the social stigma of sex work. 
A sex worker has little or no credibility with those who determine public 
policy and who wield authority over conditions of employment. These 
figures of authority often share and may even help to shape the typical 
public sentiment about sex workers: sex workers lack intelligence and 
control over their lives.31 
III. Social Barriers to Challenging the Independent Contractor 
Status Within the Field of Erotic Dance 
Independent contractors are part of a larger category known as 
contingent employees, a rapidly growing part of the labor force. 32 
Contingent employment also includes temporary and part-time workers. 33 
Contingency workers may be found in all parts of the labor market, from 
heavy industry to service work.34 These workers deviate from a full-time 
work arrangement, in that they work fewer hours and receive less 
benefits.35 
There is some debate over who benefits most from this arrangement. 36 
While there would be nothing intrinsically wrong with the fact that an 
employer benefits from a mutually satisfying arrangement, very little 
research has been done to gauge whether workers consider the independent 
contractor employment classification to their benefit.37 Although employ-
ers claim that it is to the benefit of an employee to be classed as an 
independent contractor because such classification offers the worker greater 
flexibility, employees are rarely, if ever, allowed to decide for themselves 
30. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 307-08. 
31. I feel confident in making this generalization because I have witnessed a sufficient 
number of people in professional capacities vociferously stereotyping sex workers. 
Memorably, I viewed a documentary on the life of Cicciolina, the Italian porn star turned 
parliament member with a group of museum professionals whose comments revealed that 
they did not take Cicciolina's political work seriously because of her past profession. 
32. See, e.g., Christopher Cook, Stripped of Benefits, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 25. 
33. ld. 
34. Take Another Look at All Those New Jobs, Contingent Workers are a Growing Force, 
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whether the classification suits their needs.38 Many workers who once 
had benefits as employees have been unilaterally reclassified as independent 
contractors, temporary workers, or part-time workers, without benefits, 
while performing the very same job.39 
As mentioned above,40 many strip clubs are attempting to classify 
their dancers as independent contractors. The economic reality for an erotic 
dancer is that she is often a student, a single mother, or unskilled in other 
work and lacks bargaining power to assure that her rights will be 
protected.41 As government funding is cut for college students42 and 
government funds for single mothers is hotly debated and sparingly doled 
out,43 more and more women are turning to erotic dance or other types of 
sex work to meet living expenses. In terms of monetary reward for 
minimal time expenditure, the sex industry has a lot to offer women who 
lack other kinds of work experience.44 Consequently, when business 
practices are unfair or pure "sexploitation," an erotic dancer is most often 
not in a position to complain for fear of losing her job. Management 
makes it clear that an erotic dancer is highly expendable45 and this assures 
them of a compliant group of performers. 
Workers often band together in the hopes that, through the use of a 
collective voice, they will be able to wield some power. This collective 
voice sometimes takes the form of unionization. Erotic dancers have tried 
to organize in several cities.46 In San Francisco, California, a Market 
Street Cinema dancer, Laddawan Passar, has attempted to form the Exotic 
Dancer's Alliance, assisted by the Service Employees International Union, 
Local 790.47 Ms. Passar has made it her personal crusade to improve 
working conditions for dancers.48 She has filed complaints with several 
San Francisco city agencies, has engaged in various forms of activism, and 
has attempted to unify the dancers.49 Ms. Passar formed the Exotic 
38. Brazil, supra note 2, at A18. 
39. John M. True III, Contingency Workers' Frayed Safety Net, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13, 
1993, at 7; see also Cook, supra note 32; see also Brazil, supra note 2. 
40. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 5, at 23. 
42. See, e.g., Lillian Peterson, The Choices She Had to Make When Funds For College 
Were Cut, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 2, 1993, at B15. 
43. See, e.g., Robert B. Gunnison & Greg Lucas, Wilson Proposes Smaller Cuts in 
Welfare; Governor Relents, But Some Still Find Plan Unacceptable, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 
1995, at A15; Ramon G. McLeod, Welfare Cuts Could Hit Middle Class, Too; Day Care 
Centers Would Have to Raise Rates, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1995, at AI3. 
44. See Simon, supra note 27. 
45. See Leonard, supra note 5, at 22. 
46. Martin, supra note 3. 
47. Leonard, supra note 5, at 21. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. Ms. Passar's non-union activities include filing a lawsuit against her former 
employer, the Market Street Cinema. Susan Sward, Lap Dancers Want More Than Tips; 
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Dancer's Alliance to address the issue of employment status, the issues of 
worker's rights and harassment, and the issue of working conditions.50 
However, the stigma of the occupation prevents many women from 
making their participation in the industry publicly known. Ms. Passar has 
encountered much resistance from sex industry workers who fear losing 
their jobs or making their identities public.51 It may be difficult, for 
example, to engage in picketing and to be taken seriously when such an 
activity would have to be performed in disguise, a ploy that has been 
resorted to by some erotic performers who are fearful of disclosing their 
identities in public. 52 
Many women are simply uninformed or misinformed about their legal 
rights and worry that any attempt to challenge the status quo will worsen 
their working conditions. 53 Naturally, this belief is fostered by club 
management who have much to lose if women discover that not only are 
they entitled to continue working under the same basic terms to which they 
are accustomed, but they are entitled to receive pay for it, rather than be 
required to pay the club management for the privilege. F or example, in 
Vickery v. Cinema Seven ,54 management instituted a misinformation 
campaign geared to persuade dancers at its theatre to oppose a lawsuit 
which contested the independent contractor status of the dancers. 55 This 
misinformation campaign included statements such as: "The theater will 
close if the lawsuit is successful. You will all lose your jobs or be forced 
into fixed schedules with no flexibility.,,56 The theatre management 
engaged in intimidation tactics, threatening to fire anyone who showed 
support for the lawsuit. 57 Management enlisted the help of a few select 
Women Battling to Force Theater to Pay Hourly Wages, S.F. CHRON., May 7, 1994, at A17. 
50. Exotic Dancer's Alliance Agenda (on file with the author) (organization's statement 
of purpose). 
51. Leonard, supra note 5, at 21. 
52. Conversation with Elliot Beckelman, attorney for the Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
Union, after a staged protest outside the O'Farrell Theatre in San Francisco, Cal. (July 6, 
1994). 
53. See Hamlin, supra note 4. 
54. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
55. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at paras. 3-14, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (CaL Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994); Declaration of Deanna Diaz at para. 3, 
Vickery (No. 959610); Declaration of Stephanie Friedland at paras. 1, 3-11, Vickery (No. 
959610). 
56. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 10, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Ca1. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) (quoting Anastacia Holt, spokesperson for the 
O'Farrell Theatre, and Jim Mitchell, owner of the O'Farrell Theatre). 
57. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 13, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Cal. Super Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994); Declaration of Deanne Diaz at para. 2, Vickery 
(No. 959610); Declaration of Stephanie Friedland at paras. 1, 3-11, Vickery (No. 959610). 
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dancers58 to galvanize opposition to the lawsuit among the other danc-
ers.59 
The idea of being an independent contractor versus being an employee 
may hold some semantic appeal for those women, and especially for young 
women, who are inclined to place high value on their independence. 60 
The image carries with it a hint of professionalism because it is mostly 
specialized skilled workers who are classed as independent contractors.61 
Management of the O'Farrell Theatre in San Francisco advanced the idea 
that dancers who are independent contractors are women who have attained 
their "independence," characterizing employees as "wage slaves, receiving 
a meager minimum wage. ,,62 
Women have been led to believe that they would be much worse off 
as employees. For example, one dancer from the O'Farrell Theatre of San 
Francisco commented on her independent contractor arrangement: "Now 
we can make an unlimited amount of cash--from tips alone-and work 
when we want to."63 Prior to 1988, dancers at this particular theatre not 
only made unlimited tips and enjoyed complete work schedule flexibility, 
but also received a salary of$3.35 an hour, the minimum wage at that time, 
plus the standard benefits of employment, such as disability and unemploy-
ment insurance and whatever perquisites an employee is able to negoti-
ate.64 These facts refute the belief that many dancers have: that they will 
be worse off as employees than as independent contractors. 
Media greatly influences social attitudes and has traditionally 
characterized sex workers as a moral pestilence.65 The media may be 
instrumental in reducing the potential number of supporters of a fight 
against exploitation within the sex industry. Society's moral code says that 
"bad girls" get what they deserve, even when they are a part of the 
legitimate work force and would otherwise deserve to have the benefits of 
58. These pro-management dancers are analogous to "scabs" in a union strike in their 
pursuit of self-interest to the detriment of the long-term interest of the group. 
59. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at paras. 9-12, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994); Declaration of Deanne Diaz at para. 3, 
Vickery (No. 959610). 
60. Declaration of Stephanie Friedland at para. 4, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Cal Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
61. Walter B. Moore & Daniel C. Groth, Independent Contractors or Employees? 
Reducing Reclassification Risks, 47 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 118, 118 (1993). 
62. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 4, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) (quoting Jim Mitchell, owner of the O'Farrell 
Theatre). 
63. Hamlin, supra note 4. 
64. Brazil, supra note 2; see also Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 4, Vickery 
v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
65. See, e.g., Mark Richardson, Residents Cringe as Crimes Sully Community, OTTAWA 
CITIZEN, Oct. 1, 1994, at Cl. 
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any other service industry worker.66 This lack of support hits close to 
home for many dancers who are unable to tell family and often even 
friends about their source of income for fear of ostracism. An erotic dancer 
may find little community support from women and men who express 
animosity towards the profession or are at least confused about the issue.67 
Without the emotional support of family and friends, many who might 
otherwise entertain the idea of filing lawsuits or otherwise advocating for 
their rights may be far less inclined to do so. 
Finally, an additional hurdle for a woman who might otherwise fight 
for her rights in the sex industry is her own internal debate over whether 
sex work or pornography serves a positive or negative purpose and whether 
such work is deserving of respect. 68 "There's a lot of internalized 
self-loathing [among dancers who] really don't believe they deserve to be 
paid something as basic as minimum wage .... "69 To add confusion to 
this internal debate, some sex-positive feminists view pornography as a 
necessary part of our free speech dialogue while other feminists view sex 
work as an evil which perpetuates negative sexual stereotypes. 70 A 
woman who has a negative image of her own occupation may be less 
inclined to take action to better her position within that occupation. 
IV. Legal Challenges to the Independent Contractor Status of 
Erotic Dancers 
Many erotic theatres use the classification of independent contractor as 
a legal shield to defend decisions not to payor provide benefits for their 
workers. However, a dancer is not an independent contractor simply 
because her employer has chosen this classification for her. This section 
will examine the evolution of independent contractor law, will articulate the 
factors considered by courts when determining whether a worker fits the 
legal definition of an independent contractor, and will examine these factors 
in relationship to the circumstances of employment for many erotic dancers. 
Independent contractors are part of a larger category known as 
contingent workers. 71 Contingent workers make up an estimated 
one-fourth to one-third of the national work force; this dramatic increase 
has taken place within the last ten years.72 Despite the prevalence of 
66. Brazil, supra note 2; Martin, supra note 3, at 55. 
67. See generally MEN CONFRONT PORNOGRAPHY (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1990). 
68. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 5, at 23. 
69. Martin, supra note 3, at 55 (quoting Jennifer Bryce, erotic dancer and plaintiff, 
Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 1994)). 
70. See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY 32-35 (1995). 
71. See, e.g., THE RECORD, supra note 34. 
72. Len Strazewski, Taking a Pass on Permanence; Ranks of 'Contingent' Workers 
Snowballing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 1995, at 7. Ed Gubman, a practice leader in human 
resources consulting at Hewitt Associates in Lincolnshire, Illinois, predicts that independent 
186 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1 
independent contractors in the workforce, a 1984 study by the Internal 
Revenue Service detennined that one in seven workers are wrongly 
classified as independent contractors. 73 
The Internal Revenue Service has enumerated twenty factors which 
may be used in determining a worker's rightful classification for the 
purposes of paying taxes.74 They include such factors as whether working 
instructions are given by the employer, whether an employee is trained to 
perfonn services in a particular manner, whether the employer sets the 
hours of work, and whether work is done on the employer's premises.75 
An affirmative response to these listed factors, along with others which 
show control by the employer, indicates employee status. 76 
What distinguishes an employee from an independent contractor in the 
eyes of the courts? Courts apply various tests depending on the particular 
statutory law to be applied. As one court suggested: 
When Gertrude Stein penned her oft-quoted 'A rose is a rose is a 
rose is a rose,' she was implying some universal qualities that 
defined and identified the 100 to 200 species of the flowering 
shrubs of Rosa. In contrast to the rose, when one examines the 
plethora of federal cases construing the varied and disparate federal 
statutes (ranging from the Internal Revenue Code, The Social 
Security Act, the Federal Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act to the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act, etc.), one discovers the notable absence of 
comparable universal qualities that define and identify the status of 
employee so as to fit its meaning within all common and statutory 
definitions. 77 
Strip clubs classifying their dancers as independent contractors 
generally violate the Fair Labor Standards Act.78 At common law 
employee status under the Act was measured by the degree of control 
which the alleged employer exercised or was entitled to exercise over the 
individual. 79 In 1947, this test was replaced by the broader "economic 
realities" test. 80 The economic realities test measures not only the degree 
contractors may eventually compose as much as 40% of the national work force. Id. 
73. 137 CONGo REc. E3944-01 (1991) (statement of Tom Lantos). 
74. See, e.g., Terence B. Stanaland, Contractor vS. Employee: Companies Have Reasons 
to Switch to Independents, NEWS AND REc., Feb. 28, 1994, at 11. 
75. !d. 
76. Id. 
77. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32,35-36 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
78. See 29 U.S.c.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1978 & Supp. 1995). 
79. Zippo, 713 F.2d at 36. 
80. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). 
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of control by the employer but also the degree of dependence of the 
individual upon the business to which they render services. 81 This test 
looks at the total situation, taking into account the permanency of the 
relationship, the skill required, the investment in the work facilities, and the 
opportunities for profit or loss from the activities.82 Jeffcoat v. Alaska 
Department of Labor83 and Reich v. Circle C Investments84 added 
another factor to the economic realities test: the degree to which the alleged 
employer controls work performance. None of these factors are determina-
tive, but are to be viewed in totality. 85 The courts look to both the control 
an employer has over the alleged employee and to the economic depen-
dence of the worker upon the specific company. 86 
In 1989, S. G. Borello and Sons v. Department of Industrial Rela-
tions87 added yet another factor to the economic realities test. This factor 
asks whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 
employer's business.88 The Borello court determined that the statutory 
test of control may be satisfied even where complete control is lacking, so 
long as the owner retains pervasive control over the business as a whole, 
the worker's duties are an integral part of the business, the nature of the 
work negates the need for detailed control, and adherence to statutory 
purpose favors finding employee status. 89 The court determined this five 
factor test to be more appropriate than the narrow common law test for the 
purposes of far-reaching social legislation, such as the Labor and Social 
Security Acts and the Fair Labor Standards Act.90 
Sometimes workers are unilaterally and involuntarily reclassified by the 
employer as independent contractors without any fundamental changes in 
the working conditions. This can even occur among previously unionized 
labor, as seen in Yellow Cab Cooperative v. Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board. 91 Before 1976, Yellow Cab drivers in San Francisco were 
unionized employees. 92 The company then switched to a system whereby 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dept. of Lab., 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987). 
84. Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993). 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND MINIMUM WAGES 190 (1992). 
87. S. G. Borello and Sons v. Dept. of Indus. ReI., 48 Cal. 3d 341, 355 (1989) (holding 
that "sharefarmers" are classed as employees for the purpose of worker's compensation 
coverage). 
88. Id. at 355. 
89. Id. at 355-58. 
90. !d. (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947». 
91. Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 226 Cal. App. 
3d 1288, 1292 (1991). 
92. Id. at 1291. 
188 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7: 1 
drivers leased cabs and were no longer considered employees. 93 In its 
defense, Yellow Cab argued that drivers were independent contractors 
because they "voluntarily" assumed the statuS.94 According to the 
defendant, one of the plaintiff drivers had voluntarily assumed independent 
contractor status by describing himself as self-employed to hospital 
personnel and the taxing authority. 95 The court correctly rejected this 
argument and held that when no actual choice of work terms is offered by 
the employer, a worker's acquiescence to a particular characterization is not 
evidence of a valid waiver of his or her rights.96 
As in Yellow Cab Cooperative, some employers of erotic dancers have 
unilaterally switched dancers from employees to independent contractors 
without material changes in the work requirements.97 Some women of the 
erotic dance world, like the Yellow Cab drivers, have refused to accept the 
fact that they have been unfairly classified as independent contractors. 
From Alaska98 to Texas,99 from MinnesotalOO to California, 101 some 
dancers are turning to litigation as a means of asserting their rightful 
employee status. Each case has arisen from similar circumstances: a 
working situation constructed by employers in order to deprive workers of 
their rightful benefits and to further reap profit by charging the workers a 
fee to work. 102 
Prior to 1988, dancers of the O'Farrell Theatre of San Francisco were 
classified as employees and were paid minimum wage in addition to their 
tip income. 103 In 1988, dancers were allegedly coerced into signing new 
agreements with the Theatre. 104 These new agreements classified the 
dancers as independent contractors. 105 In 1992, an O'Farrell Theatre 
dancer filed a complaint with the Labor Commission charging the theatre 
93. Id. 
94. !d. at 1301. 
95. !d. 
96. Id. 
97. Martin, supra note 3, at 54, 85. 
98. See, e.g., Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dept. of Lab., 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987). 
99. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993). 
100. See Mark Brunswick, Jury: Deja Vu Dancers Are Club Employees, STAR TRIB., Nov. 
15, 1994, at lB. 
101. See, e.g., Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc. No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 
1994); Peck v. Pacers, Inc., No. 673203 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 8, 1994); Bright v. 
Mitchell Bros. O'Farrell Theatre, No. 944271 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 18, 1992). 
102. See, e.g., Reich, 998 F.2d at 324; Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (CaL 
Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
103. See Brazil, supra note 2, at A-I8; see also, Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 
4, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 95961 0 (Cal. Super Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994); Martin, 
supra note 3, at 54. 
104. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at paras. 3-6, 12, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., 
No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
105. See Brazil, supra note 2, at A 18. 
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with liability for unpaid worker's compensation benefits, unpaid minimum 
wage, and wrongfully collected stage-use fees. 106 The Labor Commission 
decided in favor of the sole plaintiff, and the defendants appealed. 107 
During the appeal, the case settled out of court, thus setting no precedent 
for other dancers similarly situated. 
In March 1994, two more dancers filed a class action lawsuit against 
the O'Farrell Theatre. 108 Similar to the 1992 Labor Commission com-
plaint, the plaintiff's complaint in Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc. alleged 
that the theatre was liable for unpaid worker's compensation benefits, 
wrongfully collected booking fees, and unpaid minimum wage. 109 A 
contingent of other dancers later filed a motion to intervene in the suit, 
alleging that the lawsuit's plaintiffs did not adequately represent their 
interests and that they wished to remain independent contractors. 110 The 
intervention suit was unexpected; it was unclear what motivation the 
intervening dancers had in retaining their independent contractor status. 
Objectively speaking, the O'Farrell Theatre dancers enjoyed the same 
working conditions before they were re-classified as independent contrac-
tors as they did after the re-classification. III The only difference was that 
the dancers received benefits and minimum-wage pay beyond their tip 
income before they were re-classified as independent contractors. 112 
As in any class action suit, a common ploy of the defense is to cut its 
losses by preventing class certification. On closer inspection of the 
intervention suit, it became apparent that it was, in fact, initiated by the 
O'Farrell Theatre management. On April 6, 1994, Jim Mitchell, owner of 
the theatre, addressed a group of dancers at a mandatory meeting held at 
the theatre. 113 During this meeting, he introduced the dancers to a lawyer 
named Richard Idell. 114 Mitchell and various agents of the theatre 
proceeded to pressure the dancers to sign various papers in opposition to 
the lawsuit, to retain Idell as their attorney, and to buy and sell tickets to 
106. Bright v. Mitchell Bros. O'Farrell Theatre, Cinema 7 Inc., No. 11-028127-001 (Cal. 
Lab. Comm'r 1992). 
107. Jd. 
108. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
109. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) 
(second amended class action complaint for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief). 
110. See Hamlin, supra note 4, at E2. 
Ill. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3, at 54. 
112. Jd. 
113. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 3, Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 
959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 18, 1995); Declaration of Stephanie Friedland at paras. 
3-5, Vickery (No. 959610). 
114. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 3, Vickery (No. 959610); Declaration of 
Stephanie Friedland at paras. 3-5, Vickery (No. 959610). 
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a fund-raiser for legal fees. 1I5 The dancers were threatened, in both 
subtle and overt ways, with the loss of their jobs if they did not com-
ply.116 Agents of the theatre reminded individual women that they were 
keeping careful track of who had and had not signed a lawyer retainer 
agreement and that the management held the power to terminate 
non-compliant dancers. 117 On October 20, 1995, Judge William Cahill 
dismissed the intervention suit on demurrer. 1I8 He also certified a class 
of present and past dancers of the O'Farrell Theatre for the purposes of the 
class action. 119 
The plaintiffs' allegations in Vickery transcend obvious complaints 
about the lack of pay and benefits and the illegal "booking" and 
"stage-use" fees. The complaint also alleges that the O'Farrell Theatre's 
management forced employees to agree to illegal conditions of employment 
and engaged in various kinds of unfair business practices. 120 For exam-
ple, the law states than an employee may not waive employee status. 121 
The complaint alleges that this group of employees were forced to do 
precisely that by signing agreements as independent contractors. 122 
The complaint further charges the defendants with operation of an 
unlicensed talent agency. 123 When defendants established the independent 
contractor arrangement, the theatre employee responsible for scheduling 
dancers was moved from an in-house office to an office separated from the 
theatre by a city block. 124 The complaint alleges that this agent failed to 
obtain a talent license from the State Labor Commission as required by 
law. 125 
115. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at paras. 3-7, Vickery (No. 959610); Declaration of 
Stephanie Friedland at paras. 5-10, Vickery (No. 959610); Martin, supra note 3, at 86. 
116. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at para. 7, Vickery (No. 959610); Declaration of 
Stephanie Friedland at paras. 9-10, Vickery (No. 959610). 
117. Declaration of Catherine Sanders at paras. 4-6,12, Vickery (No. 959610); Declaration 
of Stephanie Friedland at paras. 9-10, Vickery (No. 959610). 
118. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) 
(order for reassignment to plan 3 and resetting trial date; granting plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration; approving class notice and procedures and restricting defendants' and 
intervenors' contact with class members; granting motion for judgment on the pleadings re: 
intervenors' complaint with limited leave to amend). 
119. !d. para. 2. 
120. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) 
(second amended class action complaint for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief). 
121. Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dept. of Lab., 732 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Alaska 1987); see also, 
Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material, Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1983). 
122. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (CaL Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) 
(second amended class action complaint for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief). 
123. ld. at 21. 
124. This separate office is located at 990 Geary Street in San Francisco, Cal. 
125. Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) 
(second amended class action complaint for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief). 
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An additional innovative cause of action included in the claim is 
"failure to provide uniforms."'26 The theatre encourages, and clients 
expect, that certain attire be worn by the dancers. '27 While many people 
might associate a uniform with a drab polyester coat or perhaps an apron, 
a uniform is legally defined to include any clothing of distinctive design or 
color which an employer requires the worker to wear as a condition of 
employment. 128 Lingerie was never before described in such a mundane 
fashion. 
"For women supposedly in control of their work lives, the dancers are 
required to follow a lot of other people's rules."'29 In addressing the 
basic legal question--whether these workers are employees or independent 
contractors-Vickery is quite similar to other legal battles which have been 
successfully fought by erotic dancers elsewhere. 13o These other cases will 
undoubtedly be persuasive authority because of their factual similarities to 
the Vickery case.131 These cases identified the factors described be-
low,132 as germane to the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors. 
A. PERMANENCE OF RELATIONSHIP 
The longer a worker remains with the same employer, the more likely 
courts are to categorize that worker as an employee, rather than as an 
independent contractor. 133 In general, dancers of the O'Farrell Theatre 
work at a theatre for several years 134 and thus establish long-term 
relationships with their employers. These employers would most likely 
find it difficult to maintain, on a consistent basis, fresh new faces willing 
to perform the job. Quality control demands that clubs retain women who 
appeal to their clients; this leads to extended relationships with the pools 
of dancers who satisfy that need. 
However, length of employment is not wholly determinative of 
employee status. Defendants in Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc. 135 
argued that the relevance of the permanent relationship between dancer and 
126. Id. 
127. A tour of the O'Farrell Theatre will support this fact. Furthennore, I have inside 
knowledge of this fact from working as a summer associate with the law firm representing 
the plaintiffs in Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 
1994). 
128. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §11100 (1996). 
129. Martin, supra note 3, at 52. 
130. Id. at 85. 
131. Id. 
132. Supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text. 
133. Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc. 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993). 
134. Interview with Beth A. Ross, counsel for plaintiffs in Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., 
No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994) (June 28, 1994). 
135. Reich, 998 F.2d at 328-29. 
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strip club was minimized by the fact that dancers were not restrained from 
seeking employment or from dancing at clubs other than the defendant's 
club. The court acknowledged the validity of this argument, but was not 
persuaded that it outweighed other relevant factors. 136 The court's 
acceptance of this argument was perhaps overly generous. After all, many 
employees who accept positions with several different employers can be 
considered employees of each employer. 
B. SKILL REQUIRED 
If an employment posItion requires special skill, courts are more 
inclined to categorize that position as one of an independent contractor 
rather than that of an employee. 137 Strip clubs are eager to have young, 
inexperienced workers 138 who are unaccustomed to making the high 
salary the profession may command. Youth, inexperience, and the potential 
for significant financial reward make these workers less inclined to question 
working conditions. 139 Of additional benefit to the employer is the fact 
that youth is a big draw for clients. 140 As for the work itself, a job 
description might read, "Must be capable of strutting across a stage, 
removing clothing, and of making social and/or sexual contact with 
customers.,,141 Gone are the days of burlesque which some people l42 
consider a true art form. 143 The argument that nude dancing is an art 
form has been attempted by at least one club-owner defendant but was 
rejected by the court. The court held that "the skill required for topless 
dancing was slight."I44 
As a corollary to the measure of skill required, some courts also 
consider the degree of initiative required in the performance of the job 
when determining employee status; the greater the amount of initiative 
required, the more likely the worker is an independent contractor. 145 As 
136. Id. at 328-29. 
137. Id. at 328. 
138. Martin, supra note 3, at 55. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. In my capacity as a summer associate for the law finn representing the plaintiffs in 
Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994), I heard 
a dancer describe her job in this way. A visit to a typical strip club will substantiate this 
job description. 
142. Luminaries such as burlesque queen Tempest Stonn and cult film maker John Waters 
would include themselves in this category of nostalgic theatre connoisseurs. 
143. This is not to say that present-day erotic dancers are not inventive and artistic in their 
presentation but to say that such skill is not required or expected. 
144. Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dept. of Lab., 732 P.2 1073, 1077 (Alaska 1987). See also Reich 
v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993). 
145. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Brock v. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 924 (1987). 
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for the initiative exerted by dancers, the court in Reich concluded that this 
element is neither satisfied by a dancer's ability to establish a rapport with 
customers nor by her costumel46 and dance choices. 147 The Reich court 
held that neither of these facts indicate sufficient initiative to demonstrate 
that a worker is in business for herself, or, in other words, that she is an 
independent contractor. 148 
C. INVESTMENT IN WORK FACILITIES 
A third factor courts will weigh in determining employee status is the 
extent to which a worker invests in the work facilities; greater worker 
investment indicates independent contractor status. 149 Most employees 
are non-investors in the workplace. The policy underlying worker 
protection laws is that "workers without capital must submit to the 
authority of those who attach them to their capital.,,150 A disparity in 
economic power typically places the investor in a position of authority over 
those who would be unable to finance their own business venture. 
In the case of the typical strip club, the investment in the work 
facilities comes directly from the employer. lSI The employer rents the 
building, constructs whatever internal environment is necessary (i.e. a stage 
and audience chairs), and hires the lighting and sound technician and 
management to run the operation. The dancers are dependent on their 
employers because they are less endowed to make these investments. In 
contrast to the major expenditure of running a theatre, a dancer generally 
limits her investment to costumes and a padlock. Such a minor and 
necessary expenditure on behalf of the dancer leads to a finding that the 
dancer is not in business for herself and thus is not an independent 
contractor. 152 
D. OPPORTUNITY FOR PROFIT OR Loss 
Employer control over a dancer's opportunity for profit or loss leads 
to a finding of employee status for dancers. 153 Club management 
influences this opportunity in several ways. The dancer, who works for 
tips alone, is vulnerable to an employer's whim regarding when she will 
146. While there may be some latitude for costume choice, many clubs set particular 
boundaries for what is permissible attire. My familiarity with strip club dress codes derives 
from my discussions with dancers from the O'Farrell Theatre and elsewhere in my capacity 
as a summer associate with the law firm representing the plaintiffs in Vickery v. Cinema 
Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
147. Reich, 998 F.2d at 328. 
148. !d. 
149. Id. at 327-28. 
150. LiNDER, supra note 86, at 194. 
151. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 328. 
152. Id. at 327-28. 
153 . !d. at 327. 
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work, how many hours she may work, and with whom she will have 
opportunity to come into contact. 154 The employer schedules the dancer 
for certain time slots, with full authority to decide whether a dancer will 
work a popular, profitable Friday night, or a slower, less lucrative Monday 
day shift.155 The employer has final say concerning what area of the club 
the dancer will work in if there are a variety of performance options, and 
determines the length of a dancer's shift and the amount of time she will 
spend performing on stage. 156 Through choice of advertising venues and 
content of ads, the employer determines the type of clientele the dancer is 
likely to encounter. Finally, the employer sets a door fee which will be 
prohibitive to some potential customersl57 and decides which customers 
will be granted or refused admittance at the door. In short, the employer 
has virtually complete control over a dancer's opportunity for profit or loss. 
The only influence a dancer may have over her opportunity for profit or 
loss is by virtue of her personal interactions with the customer, and even 
those interactions are subject to the management's scrutiny. ISS 
The fact that "a dancer's initiative, hustle, and costume significantly 
contribute to the amount of her tips," does not outweigh the theatres' 
significant role in her opportunity for profit or IOSS.159 Further, the 
existence of tips alone is not indicative of independent contractor 
status. 160 After all, waitresses and bellhops also receive tips but are still 
entitled to employee status. 161 
E. INTEGRAL PART OF THE BUSINESS 
A final factor courts will weigh in determining employee status is 
whether the worker is an integral part of the business: the more integral, or 
essential, a worker is to the business, the more likely a court will be to 
categorize her as an employee. 162 The dancers are the central reason for 
customers to patronize strip-clubs. 163 While some erotic theatres also 
show pornographic videos, such videos could be rented or seen at theatres 
which specialize in adult movies at less expense. The only reasonable 
154. Martin, supra note 3, at 52. Also, I familiarized myself with the business workings 
of the O'Farrell Theatre while working as a summer associate in 1994 for the law firm 
representing the plaintiffs in Vickery v. Cinema Seven, Inc., No. 959610 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed Mar. 24, 1994). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. For example, San Francisco's O'Farrell Theatre charges a thirty-dollar-per-person 
door fee. Martin, supra note 3, at 52. 
158. /d. 
159. Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993). 
160. Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dept. of Lab., 732 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Alaska 1987). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1077. 
163. See Martin, supra note 3, at 53. 
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explanation for this willingness to suffer added expense is that the 
customers pay to see the dancers. In the truest sense of the word, the 
dancers are an integral part of the business; there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the theatre and the performer which indicates the employee status 
of these performers. 
V. Policy Reasons to Enforce Minimum Wage Laws on Behalf 
of Erotic Dancers 
Some may argue that workers who receive tips, such as erotic dancers, 
have less need to receive a guaranteed minimum wage. l64 After all, the 
argument goes, why should it matter whether a worker is paid by a 
customer of the business or by the employer when she will end up with 
money in either scenario? 
This argument is myopic. Independent contractors who depend solely 
on tips for their income are not assured of that income in the way that 
employees are. To further understand why this argument is unsound, we 
must probe the legislative reasoning behind minimum wage laws, as 
provided for under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 165 
First, a minimum wage is intended to provide a "living wage.,,166 In 
the case of erotic theatres or other tip-dependent industries, there is never 
a guarantee that customers will frequent a business, much less that such 
customers will tip. Because tips are not a guaranteed substitute for wages, 
the onus is upon the employer to assure the worker of a living wage. 
Statutes and case law address the employer's obligation by stating that tips 
may not in any way substitute for a minimum wage. 167 
Second, the owner of a business may not impose upon the community 
the social costs of maintaining a work force. Unemployment insurance, 
which is deducted from wages, provides a safety net for employees. 
Conversely, independent contractors are not eligible to receive unemploy-
ment benefits and thus may have to appeal to welfare in a worst-case 
scenario. Society should not have to provide a subsidy for unconscionable 
employers by footing the costs of social welfare. 168 
164. This argument has been unsuccessfully used by restaurants contesting the even 
application of minimum wage laws to their wait staff. See, e.g., Cal. Drive-in Restaurant 
Ass'n et al. v. Clark et aI., 22 Cal. 2d 287 (1943) (stating that the purpose of minimum 
wage laws would be compromised by allowing tips to substitute for all or part of the wage); 
Henning et at v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n et at, 46 Cal. 3d 1262 (1943) (holding that 
tips are the sole property of the worker and may never be deducted from wages the 
employer owes the employee). 
165. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201-219 (West 1978 & Supp. 1995). 
166. LINDER, supra note 86, at 119. 
167. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 1989); Cal. Drive-in Restaurant Ass'n, 22 
Cal. 2d 287; Henning, 46 Cal. 3d 1262. 
168. LINDER, supra note 86, at 96. 
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Perhaps finally, minimum wage legislation was intended to serve as a 
form of surrogate labor union. 169 The typical minimum wage earners 
tend to be women, younger workers, or minorities who might not be 
protected otherwise. 170 In order to guarantee erotic dancers of a "living 
wage," and in order to place that cost burden and the burden of protection 
against unemployment correctly on employers rather than on society, we 
must ensure that dancers receive the benefit of minimum wage laws. 
VI. Proposal 
This section offers three solutions to the social and legal problems that 
many female sex workers face. First, the concept of harm reduction should 
be applied to the occupation of erotic dance. Second, and related to the 
change in attitudes which could result from an application of harm 
reduction, legislators should give greater attention to involuntary indepen-
dent contractors. Finally, programs should be funded which encourage 
broader occupational options for women. 
A. CHANGE IN A ITITUDES--THE CONCEPT OF HARM REDUCTION 
Sex work has endured many obstacles and persevered through the ages. 
Neither strict legislation, various types of negative attention, nor strategic 
ignorance will likely effect its demise. Legislators have focused perhaps 
an undue amount of regulation upon the field of sex work, creating a broad 
class of victimless crimes. 171 This regulation has penalized thousands of 
women for pursuing a profession which is a readily available alternative to 
dependence upon individual men in the roles of husband, father, or 
significant other. No body of research conclusively proves that sex work 
causes a particular harm, yet society has condemned it for centuries. 
Consumption of commercial sex is viewed as avice, 172 alongside such 
activities as gambling, drinking and drug use. Fostering acceptance for the 
various forms of sex work 173 can only lead to an improved quality of life 
for those engaged in such work. 
169. !d. at 98. 
170. See id. at 97. 
171. These regulations include laws against prostitution and rules governing the permissi-
ble acts which may be performed within a strip club. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., 
POLICE CODE art. 15.3 § 1071.1 (1985); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE art. 2 § 215 
(1985). 
172. The title of the police detail assigned to prostitution--the "vice squad"-is indicative 
of this view. 
173. Even if certain types of sex work, such as prostitution, remain criminal, an active 
acknowledgment and acceptance of sex work as a valid means of earning a living could 
improve conditions by removing the shroud of anonymity that sex workers currently must 
adopt. 
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Such acceptance would be fostered by an embrace of the concept of 
harm reduction. Harm reduction, propounded by such noted scholars as Joe 
McNamara of the Hoover Institute, calls for a decriminalization of all vices 
on the theory that a great deal of energy is wasted in an effort to curb those 
practices which are consensual and arguably harm only the consenting 
parties. 174 The proponents of harm reduction call for society to mitigate 
the resulting harm, rather than continue attempts to stifle the conduct 
itself. 175 
For example, in the context of drug use, harm reductionists advocate 
providing clean needles for addicts who will use drugs regardless of 
whether they have clean needles in the hopes that those addicts can at least 
benefit from HIV protection. 176 This type of mitigation of individual 
harm is not without a greater benefit to society. An obvious benefit is that 
an addict who is prevented from contracting HIV will cost the public less 
in medical treatment bills. Also, such action will decrease the number of 
vectors for transmission. An additional, though perhaps less obvious, 
benefit is that a police officer who may be accidentally pricked by a needle 
in making a drug arrest would experience less risk of contracting HIV.I77 
An often-heard conservative argument against harm reduction contends 
that if society condones certain conduct by reducing the resulting harm to 
individuals who engage in the conduct, more people will engage in that 
harmful conduct. However, providing clean needles to drug users, or even 
regulating drugs rather than criminalizing them, while producing great 
overall social benefit, would not necessarily lead to an increase in addicts. 
There is no evidence that a larger number of addicts exist in countries 
which have higher legal tolerance for drugs. In fact, evidence to the 
contrary exists. 178 Further, social outreach to those who would appreciate 
help in freeing themselves from addiction is facilitated by an atmosphere 
of support rather than one of animosity. 179 
Society marginalizes sex workers in the same way it does drug users; 
such an attitude is counter-productive in both instances. The theory of 
harm reduction, if applied within the context of erotic dance, would call for 
174. Joe McNamara, Address at the San Francisco Chapter of the American Civil Liberties 
Union Annual Meeting (June 21, 1993). 
175. Id. 
176. Michael R. Aldrich, Ph.D., Address at the California Drug Policy Coalition/California 
NORML International Drug Reform Conference 1 (Aug. 21, 1993) (transcript on file with 
the author). 
177. Id. 
178. See, e.g., Henk Jan van Vilet, Drug Policy as a Management Strategy, 1.1 INT'L J. 
ON DRUG POL'y, July-Aug. 1989, at 27, 28. 
179. See Aldrich, supra note 177. 
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protection rather than harassment and derision of sex workers. 180 If 
society did not, on some level, believe that these dancers deserve to be 
exploited,181 and if clubs did not classifY them as independent contractors, 
erotic dancers would benefit from the unemployment insurance which 
accumulates from wages. This insurance protects the rest of society from 
having to support those workers, in times of poverty, through welfare 
programs. In addition, taxes are easier to collect directly from wages. The 
fonns which the strategy of hann reduction take can range from an equal 
application of existing laws to special outreach and education. Some 
suggested fonns are discussed below. 
B. LEGAL PROTECTION OF CONTINGENT AND SEX WORKERS 
Legislators should give increased attention to the plight of the 
often-involuntary contingent worker. For example, Representative Tom 
Lantos of California has sought to prohibit companies from using long-tenn 
contractors instead of offering the job security and benefits of full-time 
employment. 182 While this move may be somewhat extreme, it correctly 
recognizes that independent-contract labor is subject to grave exploitation 
by companies who seek to save money by paying workers less, or not at 
all. 
Another legislative solution might be to offer tax amnesty to employers 
who offer to re-classifY workers who were in good faith wrongly classified 
as independent contractors. 183 This move would encourage employers to 
admit their error without penalty. However, the danger in offering tax 
amnesty is that companies may prefer to take a calculated business risk, 
specifically, to misclassifY workers and save money for perhaps several 
years, if such a strategy may later be rectified, penalty-free. 
C. WORK ALTERNATIVES TO THE SEX INDUSTRY 
Women are slowly gaining acceptance within the world of ideas and 
business. However, while a position in the business world may offer a 
woman a salary comparable to that available in the sex industry,184 any 
current occupational choice will likely have some gender-based drawbacks. 
180. Harm reduction has most often been applied to drug use, but has recently appeared 
in the idea of providing condoms for prostitutes. 
181. Martin, supra note 3, at 55. 
182. True, supra note 39. 
183. An effort at such a solution was unsuccessfully made in 1991; California 
Congressperson Tom Lantos introduced the "Misclassification of Employees Act" which 
would have provided for such tax amnesty. H.R. 3813, to2d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 
4216, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The Act was not passed into law. 
184. I am advocating for an increase in options for women rather than condemning sex 
work as an occupational choice. I believe that choice of occupation should not be dictated 
by economic circumstances. 
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For instance, Clarence Thomas' nationally broadcast Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings opened a dialogue about one vexing situation that 
many women face in the mainstream work environment--sexual harass-
ment. IRS 
Women have traditionally been forced to work in underpaid profes-
sions. There are at least two apparent solutions to that situation. These 
solutions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One solution requires 
changing society's value system to promote greater appreciation for 
"women's work,"186 such as teaching, mothering, nursing, cooking, etc. 
This particular route requires a wholesale restructuring among a population 
which may not recognize any benefit from such a change in attitude. 
The other solution, which would be arguably easier to implement, is to 
support and encourage women who enter non-traditional fields. Several 
agencies and organizations specialize in helping women in the sex industry 
make transitions into other work.187 Organizations such as the American 
Association of University Women focus on educating young girls through 
such efforts as science and math events for girls exclusively and by 
fostering positive role models: women who promote their outside-the-home 
professions to schoolchildren. 188 The AAUW has also followed the lead 
of the Ms. Foundation in implementing a "Take Our Daughters to Work 
Day.,,189 
"Take Our Daughters to Work Day" is a day for girls to accompany 
their employed mothers l90 and to witness the fact that many women 
perform societal functions in addition to those of wife and mother. The 
world is replete with images of women which narrowly categorize them. 
Perhaps "Take Our Daughters to Work Day" is one way in which this 
ubiquitous and limiting conditioning can be countered. 
This specially organized event is not without its critics, however. For 
instance, Katha Pollitt said: 
If a girl's mother is a construction worker or a professor or a tuba 
player, it's a safe bet her daughter already sees the advantage of 
bucking gender stereotypes. If, as is vastly more likely, her mom 
185. See, e.g.. Morning Edition (National Public Radio, July 26, 1995) (transcript on file 
with the author). In this interview, California Senator Barbara Boxer commented, "If you 
look at the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas case, which was brought into the public and it was 
embarrassing, it was uncomfortable, but it started a dialogue across this nation .... " Id. 
186. I intend this tenn to mean work traditionally perfonned by women. 
187. The Mary Magdelen Society in Los Angeles, Cal., and COYOTE ("Call Off Your 
Old Tired Ethics") in San Francisco, Cal., are examples of such organizations. 
188. EVA MERRICK, A WOMAN'S PLACE Is IN THE WORLD (Am. Ass'n ofUniv. Women, 
Cal. State Div. and S.F. Branch) (pamphlet on file with the author). 
189. I served as Public Policy Chair to the AAUW's San Francisco Branch in 1992-93 and 
thus have personal knowledge of this implementation. 
190. This practice is undoubtedly not limited to a girl's legally recognized "mother." 
200 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7: 1 
belongs to the 77 percent of women who are crammed into 
female-ghetto job categories (clerical, sales, secretarial, nursing, 
etc.), going to work with her mother will open a girl's eyes to how 
hard her mother works-and that too is important--but how will 
it suggest another life?191 
Despite Ms. Pollitt's criticism, this program serves its intended purpose by 
making visible a greater number of options to girls. 
VII. Conclusion 
The ponderous process of litigation and the lack of social support for 
dancers reward strip theatres by permitting them to profit from unfair 
business practices. l92 For instance, "by charging stage fees and cutting 
out employment costs, the [O'Farrell Theatre] may come out ahead as 
much as $2 million a year.,,193 Each day brings a fresh batch of theatre 
customers who pay a full door charge to the theatres to see dancers who 
are, ironically, also paying the theatres. 
If nothing else, however, the Vickery suit, and other similar suits, may 
have commanded the attention of theatre managements and dispelled some 
unrealistic images of erotic dancers held by the public. 194 In fact, these 
dancers are just like other exploited members of the work force. Hopeful-
ly, in time, and through the efforts of activist dancers and those who 
support them, the law will acknowledge their equal status. 
191. Katha Pollitt, Subject to Debate; The Ms. Foundation Project, Take Our Daughters 
to Work Day, THE NATION, May 2, 1994, at 584. 
192. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3, at 54. 
193. Martin, supra note 3, at 54. 
194. Sex workers are rarely depicted as leading average human lives. Movies glamorize 
the high-class call girl who lives a jet-set life or is rescued from her profession by a wealthy 
and invariably handsome man. Movies illustrating this point include PRETTY WOMAN 
(Touchstone 1991) and the recently released HEIDI FLEISS: HOLLYWOOD MADAM (In 
Pictures 1996). Erotic dancers are portrayed as consorting with Mafioso and leading a 
generally colorful life. These images are contrasted with gritty, dramatic images of street 
prostitutes. Perhaps the press coverage of erotic dancers who are trying to gain the respect 
which employee status and benefits accord will cause some people to see erotic dancers in 
a more realistic light. 
